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‡ On the Development of Spinoza’s Account of Human Religion ‡ 
In his philosophical and political writings, Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) develops an account 
of  human religion, which represents a unique theoretical orientation in the early modern period.1 This 
position is implicit in many of  Spinoza’s philosophical arguments in the Treatise on the Emendation of  
the Intellect, the Short Treatise, and Ethics.2 However, it is most carefully developed in his Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus (hereafter TTP).3 What makes Spinoza’s position unique is the fact that he rejects a 
traditional conception of  religion on naturalistic grounds, while refusing to dismiss all religion as an 
entirely anthropological phenomenon. This might, at first, seem like an illegitimate attempt to avoid 
the full implications of  a naturalistic world view; however, Spinoza has sophisticated arguments, from 
within his philosophical perspective, which defend both aspects of  his view. In this manner, Spinoza’s 
work reveals the possibility of  a theoretical orientation that was unimaginable to many of  his 
contemporaries. 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to become clear on what is meant by Spinoza’s 
naturalism. In contemporary philosophy, the term “naturalism” is generally used to refer to a range of  
positions which hold that philosophical theories must respect the view of  the world revealed by the 
natural sciences and use the discoveries of  the natural sciences as a guide. In religious studies, 
naturalism is generally used to characterize positions that explain religious beliefs and practices 
entirely within the domain of  the natural and social sciences. Each of  these positions share significant 
                                                 
1
 The issue of Spinoza’s name is a matter of some debate in the secondary literature on Spinoza’s Jewish identity. Authors emphasizing 
the Jewish aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy tend to prefer the Hebrew Baruch over the Latin Benedict. Here, I respect Spinoza’s own 
decision to utilize the Latin form of his name in his philosophical publications. For further discussion of this topic, see the introduction 
to Ze’ev Levi, Baruch or Benedict: On Some Jewish Aspects of Spinoza’s Philosophy (New York: P. Lang, 1989). 
2
 All references to Spinoza’s philosophical works utilize the translations in Edwin Curley, trans., The Collected Works of Spinoza: Volume I 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). Citations follow the standard Gebhardt pagination. 
3
 All references to Spinoza’s TTP utilize the translation in Samuel Shirley, trans., Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1989). 
Citations refer to the pagination in the Shirley text.  
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affinities with Spinoza’s view, but the form of  naturalism found in Spinoza’s philosophical system is 
more closely tied to rationalism. 
Spinoza’s naturalism is, perhaps, best grasped by considering the argument Spinoza provides 
for the impossibility of  miracles in chapter six of  the TTP. Spinoza begins by supposing, for the sake 
of  argument, that miracles occur. He points out that a miracle, by definition, “must necessarily 
interrupt Nature’s order which otherwise we would conceive as fixed and immutable by God’s 
decrees.”4 He then argues that this opposition to God’s establishment of  natural order would “cast 
doubt on everything, and would lead to atheism.”5 This argument reveals the fact that Spinoza views 
the impossibility of  miracles, and, by implication, naturalism as a logical consequence of  the existence 
of  God. Spinoza’s conception of  God is based entirely on rational investigation and is devoid of  
theistic elements. Thus, Spinoza’s belief  in God, properly understood, is nothing more than a belief  in 
a natural world governed by fixed and immutable laws derived from reason. 
Spinoza’s view of  nature leads him to dismiss the vast majority of  religious beliefs and 
practices as purely anthropological phenomena, while preserving a core of  essential religious belief  
which he defends through reason. Among the beliefs and practices which Spinoza dismisses is belief  in 
the occurrence of  miracles, the authority of  scriptural revelation, and the existence of  a personal deity 
as well as the practice of  rituals in general. For Spinoza, these aspects of  human religion cannot be 
grounded in rational argumentation, so their origins must explained through anthropological 
principles. However, in chapter fourteen of  the TTP, Spinoza presents a number of  fundamental 
principles of  faith, which he defends as objectively valid. Among these are a belief  in God’s existence, 
various basic features of  God’s nature, and basic ethical principles.6 His defense of  these principles in 
                                                 
4 
Shirley, Tractatus, 129. 
5
 Ibid., 130. 
6
 Shirley, Tradtatus, 224. Spinoza’s fundamental principles of faith include a number of aspects which might, at first, seem to be theistic in 
nature. For instance, Spinoza holds that God is just and merciful and includes belief in immortality. However, Spinoza’s account of such 
features in Ethics reveals that he often transforms theological vocabulary in a manner that removes its theistic elements, while 
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Ethics reveals that, for him, they follow as logical consequences of  God’s nature. A contemporary 
naturalist might argue that belief  in the existence of  God is inconsistent with naturalism. However, 
since the existence of  God, which Spinoza believed could be established by reason, is logically prior to 
naturalism in the sense that Spinoza understood it, this does not reveal any inconsistency in Spinoza’s 
view. Thus, both Spinoza’s rejection of  traditional religion and his defense of  purified religious belief  
follow from his commitment to reason. 
The manner in which Spinoza’s theoretical orientation has been introduced might make it 
tempting to imagine Spinoza as having reached his ideas through pure philosophical reflection in 
isolation from the intellectual climate of  his times. After all, Spinoza clearly rejects the position of  
traditional theologians; yet he clearly also rejects the skeptical attitude of  figures like Isaac La Peyrère 
whose primary goal was to cast doubt on traditional religious authority.7 In fact, in his philosophical 
writings, Spinoza often treats the skeptic as a stubborn fool who is barely worth consideration by a 
serious thinker. Yet, adopting the attitude that Spinoza’s ideas developed in an intellectual vacuum 
would be a mistake. Not only would it wrongly ignore the substantial intellectual debt Spinoza owes to 
many of  his predecessors, but it would also obscure the very source of  Spinoza’s originality.  
Instead, I will argue that Spinoza is able to reach a unique position on religion by synthesizing 
a number of  seemingly disparate perspectives into a coherent and systematic view. In this manner, I 
hope to show that it is Spinoza’s unusual historical position on the crossroads between a number of  
heterogeneous intellectual traditions in conjunction with his own remarkable drive to combine these 
perspectives into a coherent philosophical framework that led to his original contribution. This paper 
will provide a narrative account of  the development of  Spinoza’s view of  religion while considering 
the known biographical details of  his life. Thus, it will attempt to roughly follow the chronological 
                                                                                                                                                                         
preserving a sense in which such terms can be used properly. It is in this light that Spinoza fundamental principles of faith should be 
interpreted.  
7 
Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism From Savonarola to Bayle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 239. 
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order in which Spinoza was exposed to important ideas about religion beginning with the Jewish 
philosophy of  Moses Maimonides, proceeding to the political philosophy of  Nicollò Machiavelli and 
Thomas Hobbes, and ending with a discussion of  the political climate of  the Dutch republic. 
Rational Religion in Maimonides 
Moses Maimonides (1138-1204) was an Egyptian rabbi and is widely regarded as the most 
significant medieval Jewish philosopher. Spinoza likely first became acquainted with Maimonides’ 
philosophy through his elementary education in the Talmud Torah school of  the Amsterdam Jewish 
community and probably went on to study him more extensively while attending Rabbi Mortera’s 
Keter Torah adult study group in the early 1650s.8 This also must have been the period in which 
doubts about Judaism were first emerging for the young Spinoza. According to his early biographer 
Jean Maximillen Lucas, the young Spinoza frequently posed questions to his teachers, which they 
found difficult to solve.9 One can imagine that he was frequently referred by these teachers to 
Maimonides’ Guide of  the Perplexed, the natural starting point for a philosophically inclined Jewish 
thinker. Given his increasing tension with the Jewish community ending with expulsion in 1656, 
Spinoza must not have been fully satisfied with the answers he found there.  
Maimonides is one of  the few authors to whom Spinoza refers explicitly in his writings. These 
references are almost entirely critical and mostly concern Maimonides’ approach to scriptural passages 
which conflict with philosophical reasoning. Yet, in many other passages, ideas clearly found in 
Maimonides are presented by Spinoza as his own without any mention of  their origin. Furthermore, 
the fact that Maimonides had a decisive impact on the development of  a number of  aspects of  
Spinoza’s philosophy is well-established in the secondary literature on the topic.10 In addition to cases 
in which Spinoza more or less directly adopts a Maimonidean position, his philosophy is also enriched 
                                                 
8 
Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 90-3.  
9 
Abraham Wolf, trans., The Oldest Biography of Spinoza (Port Washington: Kennikat Press, 1970), 42. 
10
 See Warren Harvey, “A Portrait of Spinoza as a Maimonidean,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 19 no.2 (1981): 151-172. 
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by critical reflection on Maimonides. In particular, critical reflection on Maimonides’ treatment of  
religious beliefs led Spinoza to the view that some beliefs form an essential rational core, while others 
cannot be rationally justified.  
One of  the overarching concerns of  Maimonidean philosophy is showing that the revealed 
truth of  Mosaic Law is perfectly consistent with conclusions reached rationally through philosophical 
reflection. In Maimonides’ case, this meant showing that Hebrew scripture is consistent with 
Aristotelian philosophy. In the Aristotelian view, God is the unmovable mover who remains outside of  
nature. According this view, “the world derives from the overflow of  God…and He has cause to 
overflow to it everything that is produced in time.”11 God is not aware of  the particular beings which 
result from the overflow of  his eternal act of  self-contemplation nor is he capable of  undergoing any 
change.12 While Spinoza’s own view of  God differs in important respects from Aristotle’s, the 
differences need not concern us here as each view is entirely abstract, rational, and impersonal. 
This conception of  God presents a number of  problems to a devout Jewish rabbi such as 
Maimonides. He is committed, at least outwardly, to maintaining that scriptural teachings are perfectly 
true. He cannot simply reject scripture when it contradicts philosophical reasoning. Instead, 
Maimonides strives to offer non-literal interpretations of  difficult passages. For instance, consider his 
treatment of  the following passage from Genesis: “And Moses hid his face for he was afraid to look at 
God.”13 Maimonides cannot accept that Moses was afraid to literally look upon God because this would 
imply that Moses, the greatest prophet (and therefore the greatest philosopher for Maimonides), 
thought God was an embodied entity who “can be apprehended by the eyes.”14 Instead, Maimonides 
interprets this passage as utilizing a figure of  speech in which looking upon God serves as a metaphor 
for acquiring true knowledge. Moses, with his prophetic insight into God, was not literally afraid to 
                                                 
11 
Shlomo Pines, trans., Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 279. 
12 
Howard Kreisel, “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” The Jewish Quarterly Review 75 no.2 (1984): 108. 
13
 Exodus 3:6, Revised Standard Version. 
14 
Pines, 29. 
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look upon God; rather, his true fear was of  making “categoric affirmations in favor of  the first opinion 
to occur to him” and erring in judgment.15 
 Insofar as this view of  the relationship of  reason and revelation is utilized as an approach to 
the interpretation of  scripture, Spinoza rejects the Maimonidean position. Spinoza directly attacks and 
ridicules this view in a clear expression of  intellectual frustration: 
Maimonides and some others take the view that this and all other instances of  the apparition 
of  an angel…occurred in dreams, on the ground that nobody could see an angel with his eyes 
open. But this is mere rubbish. They are concerned only to extort from Scripture some 
Aristotelian nonsense and some fabrications of  their own; and this I regard as the height of  
absurdity.16 
There is only one other place in the Spinozistic corpus where Spinoza makes a similarly harsh attack 
directed at a single figure. In that passage in Ethics, Spinoza derides Descartes’ dualistic philosophy of  
mind, which he clearly views as absurd.17 In both cases, Spinoza’s frustration has the same basis. In 
Spinoza’s view, each thinker has failed to rigorously pursue the clear implications of  a position because 
he sought to preserve some traditional belief. In the passage above, Spinoza describes Maimonides’ 
response to cases in which scripture contradicts his Aristotelian convictions. Instead of  accepting 
what, to Spinoza, is the obvious conclusion that scripture does not accurately teach scientific truth 
about the world, Maimonides seeks to escape this conclusion by adopting a hermeneutical position that 
allows him to resolve the apparent conflict without calling scripture into question. From Spinoza’s 
perspective, Maimonides came within reach of  the important realization that scripture is merely a 
fallible human creation, but he turned away from this view because of  his unwillingness to challenge 
religious orthodoxy. As a philosopher whose work clearly testifies to his own high standards of  
intellectual honesty in the face of  distasteful conclusions, it makes sense that Spinoza would reserve 
the highest contempt for those who failed to follow through with their own ideas.  




Shirley, Tractatus, 63. 
17
 Curley, Ethics, II/28/17. 
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 Yet, as the case of  Descartes clearly shows, Spinoza did not simply ignore the views of  figures 
whom he believed had failed to follow through with their own ideas. Rather, he sought to push their 
ideas to the very logical conclusions, which they had failed to accept. In Maimonides’ case, Spinoza’s 
objection is easy to see. If  a religious claim conflicts with a rationally supported argument, then one 
should simply accept that the religious claim is mistaken. However, Spinoza is unable to stop at this 
point. By rejecting scripture as a source of  objective truth about the world, Spinoza risked being seen 
as rejecting religion entirely. In order to avoid such a charge of  atheism, Spinoza needed a way to 
distinguish between those beliefs which he wished to maintain and those beliefs which he wished to 
reject. In addition, if  Spinoza wanted his views to have any chance at all of  gaining support, he needed 
to provide some account of  religious beliefs which did not simply dismiss them as entirely worthless. 
In each case, Spinoza’s solution has its origins in Maimonidean philosophy.  
 The solution to the problem of  distinguishing between true religious beliefs and those which 
should be rejected is already implicit in the recognition of  Maimonides’ failure to pursue the logical 
conclusion of  his view. In many cases, Maimonides had no problem assenting to religious claims. For 
instance, the claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and eternal easily falls within the Aristotelian 
view. In other cases, there is significant tension in the Maimonidean outlook. In these cases, it is often 
clear to the critical reader that the demands of  Aristotelian philosophy conflict with some important 
principle of  Jewish faith in a manner that cannot be resolved by giving a figurative interpretation. In 
these cases, it is often difficult to determine Maimonides’ true stance. This has led some commentators 
to argue the Maimonides is presenting an orthodox view on the surface while truly holding a 
thoroughly Aristotelian view, a fact which he partially conceals.18 
 Maimonides treatment of  miracles provides an excellent example of  such tension in his 
philosophy. Belief  in miracles, particularly in those miracles by which God delivered the people of  
                                                 
18 
Leo Strauss, “Introduction,” in Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), xvii-xxiv. 
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Israel from slavery in Egypt, is an important element of  the Jewish faith. Furthermore, belief  in 
miracles was widely accepted in the medieval period. Thus, it should not be surprising that 
Maimonides accepts the possibility of  at least some miracles in the Guide. This includes miracles 
which Aristotle holds are impossible, such as changes in substance when God transforms water into 
blood in Exodus.19 Yet, in a sign of  his own awareness of  the tension of  his position, Maimonides 
attempts, wherever possible, to give miracles other explanations.20 This raises the question of  whether 
or not Maimonides actually believed that miracles are possible or whether he was simply offering this 
view in order to maintain an appearance of  orthodoxy.21 
 Fortunately, the issues surrounding the intentions of  Maimonides can be avoided in this 
analysis. What is important is that as a critical reader of  Maimonides’ Guide, Spinoza would have been 
well-equipped to detect the tension in Maimonides’ position and consider the possibility that 
Maimonides may have held less orthodox views that he outwardly claimed. This tension gave Spinoza 
a clear basis for differentiating between those beliefs he wished to preserve and those he wished to 
reject. Spinoza sets out this basis in chapter 13 of  the TTP in which he argues that the aim of  
scripture “was not to impart knowledge” except in the case of  basic principles which “are very few, and 
of  a very simple nature.”22 He makes it clear that those principles which are found to be essential will 
be fully supported within the domain of  philosophical reasoning and will be shared by all true 
religions. It is this division Spinoza has in mind when he writes in a letter to Henry Oldenburg, “the 
chief  distinction I make between religion and superstition is that the latter is founded on ignorance, 
the former on wisdom.”23 In this way, Spinoza’s view of  religion fits one possible interpretation of  
                                                 
19
 Pines, Guide, 345. 
20 
Kreisel, “Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” 111. 
21 
This point is raised by Steve Nadler in A Book Forged in Hell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 92. 
22 
Shirley, Tractatus, 215. 
23 
Samuel Shirley, trans., The Letters (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 333. 
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Maimonides in which he is truly a full-fledged Aristotelian but does not explicitly deny miracles so as 
to avoid weakening the faith of  the masses. 
 Spinoza’s second problem was that he needed to provide some sort of  positive role for the 
religious beliefs which he rejects in order to avoid appearing to attack religion. Maimonides provides 
Spinoza with just such an account. In his philosophical system, Maimonides distinguishes between 
those beliefs which are true and those which promote an orderly society.24 A good example of  the 
latter case can be found in Maimonides’ approach to ceremony in book III of  the Guide. Maimonides 
holds that “the law as a whole aims at two things: the welfare of  the soul and the welfare of  the 
body.”25 When faced with an apparently arbitrary law, Maimonides will seek to show its social utility. 
For instance, regarding laws concerning ritual purity, Maimonides argues that they are designed by 
God to restrain sexual desire, which would otherwise degrade society.26  
 Spinoza adopts the Maimonidean account of  ceremonial observances and non-essential 
scriptural beliefs as existing because they are necessary for an orderly society. Spinoza argues that 
“Scripture commands no other kind of  knowledge other than what is necessary to obey God according 
to [the commandment of  loving one’s neighbor], and without which men are likely to be self-willed.”27 
Thus, the belief  and practices of  scripture can be treated as useful lies, which have a good social effect 
on the masses, but need not be believed by the philosopher. However, since Spinoza denies Maimonides’ 
explanation that these practices have their origins in the benevolent intentions of  God, he must 
provide some other account explaining their origins. For such an account, Spinoza turns to the account 
of  religion in the work of  Nicollò Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. 
The Origins of  Religion in Machiavelli and Hobbes 
                                                 
24
 Ibid., 111. 
25
 Pines, Guide, 510. 
26
 Ibid., 533. 
27 
Shirley, Tractatus, 215. 
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 Spinoza most likely first became acquainted with the work of  Machiavelli and Hobbes when he 
was a student of  Fransiscus van Enden, who wrote two political works around the same period.28 The 
accounts of  religion that influenced Spinoza are found in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy and Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. There is direct evidence that Spinoza read Machiavelli as a copy of  his complete works was 
found in Spinoza’s library.29 In the case of  Hobbes, the Leviathan was not found in his library though 
Hobbes’ De Cive was among the books in his collection. However, Spinoza was almost certainly familiar 
with the Dutch translation of  his friend Abraham van Berckel, which had a significant impact on the 
intellectual scene in the Netherlands.30  
 Whether Machiavelli or Hobbes was the primary influence on Spinoza’s anthropological 
account of  human religion is a question that cannot be conclusively answered. Hobbes clearly plays a 
key role in the development of  Spinoza’s political views in the TTP. Steven Nadler identifies Hobbes’ 
Leviathan as the principle source of  Spinoza’s anthropological account of  religion and does not 
consider Machiavelli.31 However, Spinoza was already well under way in his work on the TTP in 1665 
as is indicated by his correspondence with Henry Oldenburg, whereas the Leviathan did not appear in 
any language that Spinoza could read until the Dutch translation in 1667.32 While Hobbes political 
views could have been gleaned from De Cive, which was written in Latin, his anthropological account 
of  religion does not appear there. It is possible that Spinoza was able to access Berckel’s translation 
prior to its publication date; however, it seems unlikely that Spinoza could have read the Leviathan 
during the period in which his views on religion were first forming in the early 1660s, but he would 
have read it by the publication of  the TTP in 1670.  
                                                 
28
 Nadler, Spinoza, 104. 
29
 Jakob Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s (Leipzig: Verlag Von Veit & Comp., 1899), 161. 
30 
Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 195. 
31 
Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 55-6. 
32 
Shirley, The Letters, 185. 
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 The fact that Spinoza could have read Machiavelli as soon as he began studying with van Enden 
lends credence to the view that Discourses was the primary source for Spinoza’s anthropological 
account. However, it is uncertain whether or not Spinoza would have come into contact with the 
particular passages that express this position. Since both Machiavelli and Hobbes express similar 
views, there is no way to settle this matter by investigating the texts. For instance, both Machiavelli 
and Hobbes restricted their consideration to pagan religions in order to avoid providing a controversial 
account of  Christianity.33 In the absence of  conclusive evidence either way, I will proceed on the 
plausible assumption that Spinoza was familiar with both texts and that each contributed to his 
account of  human religion. 
 Spinoza and Hobbes both identify human ignorance of  natural causes combined with the 
resulting uncertainty and fear this produces as the primary cause of  the origin of  most religious 
beliefs. Spinoza describes the masses as “the wretched victims of  alternating hopes and fears, the result 
[of  which] is that, for the most part, their credulity knows no bounds.”34 This clearly echoes Hobbes 
own view by which mankind lives in perpetual fear.35 The problem, in each case, is that events occur in 
nature whose natural cause cannot be immediately known. The result, according to Spinoza, is that “if  
they struck with wonder at some unusual phenomenon, they believe this to be a portent signifying 
anger of  the god or of  a supreme deity.”36 This argument also appears in the Leviathan, in which 
Hobbes argues that “when [man] cannot assure himself  of  the true causes of  things (for the cause of  
good and evil fortune for the most part are invisible), he supposes causes of  them.”37 
                                                 
33 
Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 197. 
34
 Shirley, Tractatus, 49. 
35 
Ian Shapiro, ed., Leviathan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 67. 
36
 Shirley, Tractatus, 49. 
37 
Shapiro, Leviathan, 66-7. 
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 The next step in the process occurs when certain individuals either consciously or 
unconsciously begin channeling the superstition of  the masses for their own benefit. Machiavelli 
provides such an account of  Roman religion: 
…every religion has the foundation of  its life on some principle order of  its own. The life of  
the Gentile religion was founded on the responses of  the oracles and on the sect of  the diviners 
and augurs. All their other ceremonies, sacrifices, and rites depended on them; for they easily 
believed that the god who could predict your future good or your future  ill for you could also 
grant it to you. From these arose temple, from these the sacrifices, from these the supplications 
and every other ceremony to venerate them.38 
Such ceremonies and rituals become more and more developed until they reach the point of  becoming 
a fully institutionalized religion. Spinoza uses the Ottoman Turks as an example: 
To counter this unfortunate tendency [of  the masses being victims of  alternating prejudices], 
immense efforts have been made to invest religion, true or false, with such pomp and ceremony 
that it can sustain any shock any constantly evoke the deepest reverence in all its worshippers.39 
In this manner, the social utility of  religion becomes part of  the anthropological account of  its origins. 
What begins as the weakness of  mankind to superstitions is transformed into a formal set of  beliefs, 
institutions, and ceremonies to benefit the interest of  the elites in ruling an orderly and obedient 
populace.40 
 Spinoza and Hobbes also use their narrative account of  the development of  superstitious 
religious beliefs and ceremonies to explain the diversity of  religious customs. As Spinoza puts it in the 
TTP, “superstition, like all other influences of  hallucination and frenzy, is bound to assume very 
unstable and varied forms.”41 Hobbes makes the same argument in more elaborate form when he writes, 
“by reason of  the different Fancies, Judgments, and Passion of  several men, have grown up into 
                                                 
38 
Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, trans., Discourses on Livy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 37. 
39 
Shirley, Tractatus, 51. 
40 
Maimonides also provides an account of sacrifices that explains religious ritual in terms of providing a substitute for the superstitious 
practices of the masses in chapter 46 of part III of the Guide. However, Maimonides’ account is not naturalistic in the sense that he 
attributes the origins of these rituals to God rather than to clever rulers. Nonetheless, Spinoza may also have been influenced by 
Maimonides on this point. 
41 
Shirley, Tractatus, 50. 
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ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to 
another.”42 In this manner, the anthropological account of  the origins of  human religion not only 
explains the causal origin of  irrational beliefs, but has the additional benefit of  solving the otherwise 
vexing problem of  the existence of  diverse religious traditions.  
Skepticism, Toleration, and the New Sciences in the Netherlands 
 Spinoza’s account of  human religion clearly owes much of  its substance to reflection on the 
work of  philosophical writings of  Maimonides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes. However, these figures were 
not interested in developing the radical implications of  their own accounts of  religion. Therefore, 
while Spinoza certainly drew much of  his philosophical analysis from these sources, it is unlikely that 
they provided the impetus behind the radical direction in which he took their views. Instead, there is 
reason to believe that the 17th century Dutch intellectual climate was the primary external factor 
influencing Spinoza to take a radical direction. Spinoza would have had his first significant exposure to 
these ideas when he began working as a merchant, which could have occurred no later than his father’s 
death in 1649.43 The influence of  these ideas would have increased after his excommunication in 1656 
and would continue for the remaining twenty-one years of  his life. 
 Skepticism about religion emerged, in its modern form, in the tumultuous period following the 
Protestant Reformation. Before this time, those individuals who held broadly skeptical views about 
religion either kept their ideas to themselves or were suppressed by religious authorities to the extent 
that their ideas failed to achieve significant influence outside of  their immediate circles. Two important 
changes occurred in the early modern period. First, major philosophical works expressing skeptical 
themes became more widely disseminated with the rise of  the printing press and the proliferation of  
religious writing spawned by the Reformation. Second, skeptical ideas began to circulate more widely 
                                                 
42 
Shapiro, Leviathan, 67. 
43 
Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 80. 
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in private intellectual circles and through personal contacts.44 Undoubtedly, the contents of  these 
private communications were often more radical than the published work that appeared in the period.  
 Amsterdam was a center of  radical ideas, and it was home to a flourishing industry centered on 
printing radical texts. Spinoza’s friend Jan Rieuwertszoon ran such a publishing business and owned a 
bookstore that served as a meeting place for individuals with radical ideas.45 Since Spinoza clearly 
frequented such circles, there can be little doubt that he was exposed to such positions. Among the 
views discussed would have been the ideas of  classical figures such as Epicurus as well as modern 
skeptics such as Montaigne and Charron. Yet one must question what impact these ideas had on 
Spinoza’s position since there is no clear evidence of  their influence in his philosophy. 
 One response to skeptical arguments about religion is to use them to attack established 
authority. Such an approach can be seen in the writings of  Uriel Acosta, who committed suicide when 
Spinoza was nine years old and lived in the same Jewish community in which Spinoza was raised. In his 
Example of  a Human Life, Acosta offers a harsh attack on the religious establishment of  rabbinic 
Judaism, which he blames for various personal misfortunes and for reducing its adherents to slavery.46 
Another response to skeptical arguments about religion is to incorporate them into a broader skeptical 
view concerning knowledge in general. This approach can be seen in the writing of  Montaigne who 
used Pyrrhonian skepticism to argue that religion had no rational basis.47 Spinoza would have been 
acquainted to each of  these skeptical outlooks through his contact with the intellectual scene in 
Amsterdam. 
 What is significant about these approaches is that Spinoza goes to great lengths to reject each 
of  them. Spinoza’s own view rejects undermining established political authority, and he is careful to 
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emphasize that point in the TTP. Spinoza’s rejection of  skepticism concerning knowledge is even more 
striking. Not only is Spinoza’s own epistemology markedly anti-skeptical, but he treats the skeptical 
figure as either ridiculous or insincere. Thus, it is unlikely that Spinoza held in high regard those who 
expressed these kinds of  skepticism about religion. This would also suggest that such ideas did not 
have a strong influence on his philosophical views.  
 However, despite the fact that Spinoza did not share or even respect the broadly skeptical views 
that he would have been exposed to in Amsterdam, there is good reason to believe that these ideas did 
play a role in his philosophical development. Despite the flaws Spinoza must have seen in the views of  
figures like Acosta and Montaigne, he must have agreed with them that the claims of  religious 
authorities should not be accepted without question. Thus, it is likely that the radical environment of  
Amsterdam encouraged Spinoza to draw more radical conclusions from the work of  figures such as 
Hobbes and Machiavelli, whose philosophical depth he would have respected. In addition, skeptical 
views would have made Spinoza sensitive to the vulnerability of  religious claims to rational 
argumentation. A natural response to this would be to seek some criterion for distinguishing between 
religious claims that are rationally defensible and those that are not.  
 The skeptical outlook of  the 17th century may explain why Spinoza chose to reject the objective 
validity of  the majority of  religious beliefs in favor of  providing naturalistic accounts of  them; 
however, it fails to explain why Spinoza sought to preserve a core of  religious beliefs in his system. 
Given the incendiary nature of  much of  Spinoza’s work, it can hardly be that he included this aspect to 
appease religious authorities. Instead, this move was motivated, in part, by Spinoza’s own experience 
of  interacting with various liberal Christians in Amsterdam. In particular, I will focus on the influence 
of  the Collegiant circles, which Spinoza was known to frequent. 
 The Collegiants were groups of  liberal Christians who met to pray and discuss theology in 
various Dutch cities, including Amsterdam. The membership of  such informal organizations was 
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constituted primarily by Mennonites, Remonstrants, and Socinians.48 While these views share certain 
affinities, they are not without differences on important theological points. At times, this led to 
controversy within Collegiant circles.49 Yet, for the most part the Collegiants must have been fairly 
tolerant in their approach to religious differences as evidenced by the fact that they accepted Spinoza, a 
non-Christian, into their midst.  
 This relative peace was achievable because of  a view among the Collegiants that only a few 
simple truths were absolutely essential to Christianity. This view likely arose as a natural response to 
the problem of  maintaining peace among holders of  diverse views within the Collegiant community. 
Central to this position was the view that the primary focus of  Jesus’ teachings was to love fellow 
humans and that the Christian faith is not dogmatic in nature.50 This view is expressed, in much the 
same form, by Spinoza when he presents his own view of  the essential elements of  religion in the 
TTP.51 Thus, it seems highly probable that Spinoza’s decision to defend a purified core of  religion had 
its origins in the view of  the Collegiant community of  which he was a member. Yet, it is important to 
remember that many of  the Collegiants, unlike Spinoza, accepted spiritualism as a legitimate source of  
religious belief. Thus, while Spinoza’s decision to defend a core of  religious beliefs may have originated 
with his exposure to liberal Christians, he does not entirely share their reasons for defending such an 
approach, which he reached through reflection on Maimonides. 
 A final influence on Spinoza from the Dutch intellectual scene would have been the adherents 
of  the new sciences. There are a number of  different routes by which Spinoza was influenced by the 
beginnings of  the scientific revolution and the mathematical view of  the world that it advocated. 
Descartes, who was a key influence on Spinoza’s philosophical work, was a major advocate of  this new 
way of  thinking. Spinoza shows interest in this kind of  thinking in his arguments concerning physics 
                                                 
48 




Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 139. 
51
 Shirley, Tractatus, 215. 
IMW Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 5:1 69  
 
 
and astronomy in his Descartes’  Principles. In addition, Spinoza maintained a correspondence with the 
English chemist Robert Boyle in which he actively discussed various experiments. Finally, Spinoza 
supported himself  as a lens grinder and is known to have had knowledge in optics from his 
correspondence with Gottfried Leibniz.  
 In addition to the influences described above, Spinoza probably read the work of  Joseph 
Delmedigo early in his education. Delmedigo was a Jewish advocate of  the new sciences and a student 
of  Galileo Galilei.52 His book on the new sciences, Sefer Elim, was published by Rabbi Menasseh ben 
Israel of  the Amsterdam community, and Spinoza was probably exposed to it at a relatively early age.53 
This text likely added weight to Spinoza’s view of  nature as a rational system of  fixed mathematical 
laws. However, the conception of  nature as governed by rational laws is already found in the 
philosophy of  Maimonides; therefore, it is likely that Delmedigo’s work merely reinforced and was not 
the origin of  Spinoza’s naturalism. However, the powerful intellectual drive of  advocates of  the new 
sciences towards a naturalistic view of  the world likely had some influence on Spinoza. 
 
 The intellectual origins of  Spinoza’s account of  religion in the diverse intellectual traditions 
which influenced his development should now be apparent. The substantive analysis of  his position is 
largely drawn from philosophical influences. His decision to divide religious beliefs into a rationally 
defensible core and a larger set of  beliefs to be justified through their social utility has its origins in 
critical reflection on Maimonides. The anthropological account of  the origin of  religions he provides 
in the preface to the TTP can be seen as a more radical version of  the accounts provided by 
Machiavelli and Hobbes. However, while the analysis came from these philosophical sources, the drive 
to draw radical implications requires a different explanation. Some of  it must be explained in terms of  
Spinoza’s inner drive to push theories to their logical conclusion and his willingness to accept 
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distasteful consequences. Yet, much of  the impetus likely came from the radical intellectual climate of  
Amsterdam at the time. Spinoza’s unusual place in the crossroads of  each of  these influences as well as 
his drive to systematize his views led to the account of  human religion that he provides in the TTP. 
 Now that the development of  Spinoza’s account has been explained, one might wonder what 
Spinoza made of  his own position. One clear implication of  Spinoza’s account is that so long as one 
preserves the essential philosophical core of  true religion, any number of  inessential religious beliefs 
could be embraced to serve as moral guidance. Spinoza embraced this implication as is clear from his 
response to a letter accusing him of  providing no way to distinguish between the false prophet 
Mohammed and the true prophets of  the Judeo-Christian tradition: 
 As for the Turks and the Gentiles, if  they worship God by the exercise of  justice and by 
 love of  their neighbor, I believe they possess the spirit of  Christ and are saved, whatever 
 conviction they may hold in their ignorance regarding Mahomet and the oracles.54 
This passage anticipates the ecumenical views of  many contemporary authors in the debate on the 
problem of  religious diversity. For instance, John Hick advocates for a philosophical conception of  
religion that can both give a realistic interpretation of  certain core elements of  religion and render 
diverse faiths compatible.55 This view was, in some respect, anticipated by Moses Mendelssohn in 
Jerusalem in which he advocates a rationalistic view of  religion and a broadly ecumenicalist attitude 
that may have been influenced by Spinoza.56 
 Yet Spinoza differs in important respects from contemporary ecumenicalists. First of  all, 
Spinoza is largely unconcerned about whether or not religious people will accept his account of  their 
religion. While he preserves a core of  religious beliefs which can be defended objectively, he dismisses 
the vast majority of  beliefs as mere prejudices. Very few faithful adherents of  any major religion could 
ever accept Spinoza’s dramatic revision of  the content of  religion. In this manner, Spinoza shares the 
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approach of  the contemporary irrealist in his approach to religious belief.57 Like the contemporary 
irrealist, Spinoza defends the majority of  religious beliefs on the ground that they lead to good ethical 
behavior. Thus, Spinoza’s account anticipates a number of  contemporary positions on religious 
diversity while not fitting neatly into any single popular account in the philosophical literature.  
 The fact that Spinoza seems to fall in between all the major positions in both the early modern 
and contemporary debates concerning the correct account of  religion might lead one to suspect that 
his view is, in some manner, inconsistent. Such an objection would begin by pointing out that Spinoza 
gives two entirely different accounts of  religious belief. He defends a small set of  core beliefs as 
objectively valid, yet he dismisses the vast majority of  beliefs and gives an anthropological account. If  
Spinoza could not provide principled reasons from within his philosophical system for this differential 
treatment, then one could rightly object that his position is inconsistent.  
 On further investigation, this worry proves to be unfounded. In each case, Spinoza’s treatment 
of  religious beliefs is grounded in his commitment to reason. Certain core beliefs can be defended 
because they follow logically from basic definitions and axioms which are known through the natural 
light of  reason. All other beliefs, by virtue of  the fact that they cannot be so derived, are necessarily 
invalid insofar as they are taken to represent objective truths about the world. However, they must be 
given some explanation, by virtue of  the fact that everything in nature behaves according to fixed laws. 
Instead, their origin is explained in terms of  various psychological features of  human beings. In this 
manner, Spinoza’s dual treatment of  religious belief  turns out to be deeply motivated by his 
philosophical system.  
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